Preview 2022 AFL Season West Coast Eagles Preview, Fixtures and how the club can contend in 2022 despite injury woes. More from Dylan82 on the second page.

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Part I - The horror! The horror!

One evening coming in with a candle I was startled to hear him say a little tremulously, “I am lying here in the dark waiting for death.” The light was within a foot of his eyes. I forced myself to murmur, “Oh, nonsense!” and stood over him as if transfixed.

Anything approaching the change that came over his features I have never seen before, and hope never to see again. Oh, I wasn’t touched. I was fascinated. It was as though a veil had been rent. I saw on that ivory face the expression of sombre pride, of ruthless power, of craven terror—of an intense and hopeless despair. Did he live his life again in every detail of desire, temptation, and surrender during that supreme moment of complete knowledge? He cried in a whisper at some image, at some vision—he cried out twice, a cry that was no more than a breath:

“The horror! The horror!”

Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness


Ok, first up - many thanks to xInfected_Virus for getting this preview thread going with a quality OP. Now, put the kettle on, get the tuna pancakes from the microwave and tell Anton_Chigurh to stock up on extra rolls in preparation for toilet breaks.


What a time to be alive. As the world wearily tries to emerge from the fires of a global pandemic, it sleepwalks into conflict that could reduce it to ashes.

Meanwhile, another season of AFL is dawning upon us.

For Eagles’ fans, this is perhaps the strangest of times. Like a descent into madness in the heart of the colonialist Belgian Congo, the trauma of the past year has left a cognitive gap – 2021 is a blank space, a wound without a memory; however it still casts a heavy shadow of doubt into the year ahead.

The question marks become louder and more numerous. Is the gameplan recoverable? Is the squad too old? Is the depth too thin? Is the commitment still there? Is there disharmony at the club? Has the coach lost the players? Is it time for a rebuild?

All of these remain unanswered and shall continue to be so until proven by performance in 2022.

More than perhaps any other club in the competition, West Coast have the potential to surprise or disappoint this season.

Which leaves supporters like us in the interesting predicament of having low expectations alongside high hopes.

Life as an Eagles supporter in 2021.


From a West Coast perspective, 2021 was nothing less than a disaster and embarrassment.

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North Melbourne spent every single round of 2021 in bottom place - the Eagles lost to them.


With one of the strongest squads on paper (a league-high 10 All-Australians), the club was gifted with its easiest fixture since 2015 and escaped the interference of Covid hubs. The injury crisis from 2020 came to an end and there was a full squad to select from for the second half of the season.

The stars had seemingly aligned – even the Grand Final was going to be hosted in WA…


Then the club failed to even qualify for finals.

It wasn’t how things were meant to have played out.


This outcome didn’t happen overnight, it has been three years in the making. Much like how a dam is breached; at first the problems are small and seemingly manageable – but they continue to eat away and reduce integrity, leading to an eventual failure that appears both sudden and catastrophic.

Increasingly at odds with the competition trend towards more direct ball movement, the reckoning for West Coast came in 2021. Rather than charging towards September with a strong squad and a soft draw, it imploded – posting the worst record in the competition after the bye.

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Defensively broken, lacking in attacking transition, and no longer feared by opponents, the Eagles limped to an underwhelming exit contrary to all expectations. The picture was of a club painted in disarray and crisis.

How did it come to this?
 
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Part II - Post-mortems

Eagles side to side

Opponent takes the middle

The club is folded

2.1 - Identity

If three years ago I was told that in 2021 West Coast would feature the following:

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My response would have been to ask how many more premierships has the club won in its dynasty?...


Alas, as we know too well, what brought success in 2018 is now far removed from that today.

Instead, 2021 for the Eagles brought the following:

2021-WCE-Stats.jpg

In terms of results, it is just as painful:
  • Losing to Fremantle [for the first time in 6 years, after 11 straight Derby victories]
  • Five home losses [the worst return at home since 2014]
  • Two 90+ point losses [last such occurrence was 2008]
  • The two matches at Kardinia Park were the 3rd and 11th lowest points totals for a match in the club’s history
  • The Round 17 loss to North Melbourne was the first time ever that the club has lost at home to an eventual wooden-spooner

On display was a radically shifted competition and a club that had completely lost its identity.


Who are the West Coast Eagles?

What can you expect when they play? What challenges do they pose to opponents?

The Simpson-era Eagles have been typified by possession football, combined with an extremely potent forward line that makes the most from its opportunities. The defence has been a deep-anchored zone, setup to maximise intercept possessions within the defensive half.

From an opposing perspective, if you turned the ball over or failed to get your hands on the ball first against West Coast, you were screwed.

So of course, they adapted. Committing extras to stoppages to get that first ball and speeding up their ball movement to negate the defensive zone before it can be set.

The club’s response to this challenge has been a negative feedback loop with an increasingly defensive outlook. Defenders unable to setup the zone in time? Get the midfielders to act like additional defenders. Afraid of opposition counterattacks through the corridor now with the midfield back? Play the small forwards behind the ball instead of ahead of it...

Now obviously pruning back offensive capability in such a way reduces the scoring output that is available – giving rise to the absurdity of retaining possession whilst lacking any cohesive forward structure to kick to. It becomes retention for the sake of retention alone rather than a means of targeted attack. Or, in other words, the purpose of the club’s tactical identity is no longer valid considering the approach exercised in 2021.

The knock-on effects, as can be imagined, are both multitudinous and dramatic.

The impact of having such a reduced offensive outlook gave the club its third-lowest scoring per game output in its history once the reduced quarter lengths of 2020 are taken into account. That is the lowest since 2008, when the forward line was led by B.McKinley. Conversely, last year featured both the first [Kennedy] and third [Darling] leading goal kickers of all time at the club for 18 of 22 matches.

After the mid-season bye, West Coast averaged less than 65 points per game.

The current streak of matches with less than 100 points scored [13] is the longest in the history of the club.

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On the other hand, the club also conceded the greatest number of opposition points per game since the final year of the Worsfold coaching era in 2013. Despite stacking the back half with additional numbers, the change to the on the mark rule further enabled competition rivals to use short disposal to pick the defensive setup apart. The zone that had generated so much success in previous years, now proved to be useless in thwarting and repelling opposition attacks.

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The instruction for the midfield to spend much of the time occupying defensive positions further reduced the amount of pressure applied upon opposition players and allowed those opponents to easily dominate both possession and territory.

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Rather than posing a formidable challenge to the competition, West Coast are being beaten in all areas of the ground in a routine basis.

What the club represents has been lost. A lot now needs to be worked upon to restore that dominant identity.
 
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2.2 - Accountability

Rather than just being a defensive team, in 2021 West Coast were a defensive team that completely lacked defensive accountability.


This is not an overstatement. The level of accountability on display last year was amateur and not anywhere near the level of expectation for a professional club at the highest level.

I am not talking about tackles or pressure here (although it does indirectly impact upon them) – this is about letting opposing players run from one end of the field to the other without being marked or no longer tracking opponents because they are not in your “zone”, only to then see them gain possession and setup opposition goals.

It is about the nature of the defensive zone to prioritise marking space over players.

I could go on and on and on about this, but it is easier to just roll the tape on some glaring examples.


Buckle up, this is some ugly viewing:


Waterman lets Henderson run free, then neither him or Sheed covers Smith. Witherden retreats away from marking Bews on the wing – allowing him to mark there unopposed. Brander attempts a half-hearted block on Cameron, which only impedes Sheppard’s marking of him. Cameron gets clear and roves a goal from the forward contest.

Amartey marks at half back. After disposing the ball, he is able to run the length of the ground unmarked before providing a handball for the goal assist.

Cunningham marks at half back. Hewett is given space in the corridor despite being surrounded by six Eagles. Cunningham tries twice to provide a running overlap from behind – the first attempt is thwarted by Jones, but nobody stays on him to prevent the second which hits up Franklin for a goal.

Sidebottom and De Goey are given freedom to lead unopposed from the kick-in. Duggan covers the wing rather than the more dangerous option that is inside him, then covers the mark in a way that allows Noble free access to options in the corridor. De Goey, still without an opponent, gets the handball receive and sets up a goal.

From the turnover Eagles players look to defend the wing whilst Collingwood have options lined up in the middle. Sidebottom gets away from Yeo and Sheed’s attempt at tackling only succeeds in taking out three team-mates. Sidebottom remains unmarked in the contest on the wing and nobody shifts onto De Goey after Gaff leaves him to get to pressure Sidebottom. De Goey receives the ball unopposed and kicks into forward 50 – Yeo is on him to pressure the kick. Inexcusably, Yeo fails to stay on De Goey who then receives the ball and finds Cameron deep inside attack for the goal.

Sheed fails to stay on Sidebottom, leading to a defensive breakdown where Redden abandons Ginnivan and hit-up Henry inside forward 50. Subsequent to this video, Henry then is able to find Thomas 35m out in front for another goal.



With the offensive capability teams now have at their disposal due to the recent rule changes, the days of being able to zone space through the middle are gone – if an opposing player is there somebody must go to them and mark up.

This is without question the biggest tactical issue that needs to be addressed by the club. Failure to do so will result in nothing less than a continuance of the trajectory taken in 2021 and a bottom 4 finish.
 
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2.3 - Ball Movement

The method based around possession retention through kicking and marking (particularly contested marking) is redundant.

Increasingly it has become nothing more than an exercise in attempting to control possession without making any territorial gain, which is completely pointless. As we fans are all too aware, and much to our frustration, West Coast will voluntarily lose territory not just once, but multiple times in a match, trying to manufacture a slow switch in play that will never open up the opposing defence and only results in additional pressure being placed upon the Eagles’ own defence that was completely unnecessary.


The indirect, slow and tortured ball movement from West Coast contrasts with the direct approach taken by the Bulldogs – no guesses which team played in last season’s Grand Final.

No other club in the entire competition exhibits such risky activity that is so lacking in reward.


This situation is primarily due to a lack of available options to kick to as the West Coast forwards are spending so much time up the ground to cover space defensively that they are often unavailable as offensive targets ahead of the ball. Thus, we encounter the all-too-familiar scenario, typified by slow, predictable ball movement that poses little threat to the opposing defence – ranking dead last of all teams for generating scores from the defensive half.

This also of course diminishes the chances of capitalising upon counterattacking opportunities when they are presented.


Insufficient numbers in the forward half of the ground abort a counterattacking chance. Instead, Geelong are able to utilise superior numbers to launch their own attacking transition to much greater effect.


It gets worse however – the want to retain possession leads to conservatism in possession. Rather than pursuing aggressive scoring avenues through the corridor, it lends to selecting options out wide on the wing where the risk appears to be lower. This is a dangerous mistake.

In a circumstance where the opponent is already generating midfield spares to neutralise both Naitanui and the zone, taking possession wide all but guarantees giving away supremacy of the corridor to the opposition in the event of a turnover.

Time for some examples:


West Coast go wide from the kick-in – note Miers taking up a position well off the mark that prevents Witherden from being a useable handball option. Whilst the Eagles shift to the wing, Geelong stacks the corridor in anticipation of a turnover opportunity. When the turnover does come the defence is left helpless and Geelong get an easy goal.

This embarrassing passage of play typifies how the club often plays into the hands of the opponent through its ball use. Three times in quick succession the wrong decision was made in attempting to bring the ball out of defence - the third resulting in a goal for Sydney.

Here the Eagles are trying to move the ball quicker, but Yeo and then Hurn go wide rather than attack the corridor against the bottom-placed team in the competition. This results in the Kangaroos gaining superior numbers in the middle of the ground, which are put to damaging use when Kelly turns the ball over under pressure.


It wasn't by chance that the club ranked 17th for metres gained and dead last in defensive 50 to attacking 50 possession chains.

Rather than the current method of sitting back and allowing the opponent to comfortably setup, the club should be getting players ahead of the ball, to stretch the opposing defence and provide those defenders with something to be worried about that creates uncertainty in terms of their positioning – doing that is how you create the opportunity for swift and direct ball movement that can tear a team to pieces.
 
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2.4 - Stoppages

Nic Naitanui is an absolute weapon.
In addition to being the spiritual captain of the club, whose efforts lift those of his team-mates around him, he is the number one stoppage player in the competition.

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A ruckman that is also the no.1 clearance and no.2 contested possessions player in the team. It is fair to say that the advantage the Eagles gain from Naitanui’s influence is significant.

Naturally, opposing sides look to nullify that stoppage impact by creating extras through the middle, usually from half forward as the West Coast defence prefers to hold their position rather than track opponents up the ground.

With the advantage of unchecked extras around stoppage, opponents are able to actively block out the primary midfielders of the Eagles, whilst leaving open channels for their team-mates to exploit in the advent of them winning the clearance. The effect can be observed in the contrast for the club between clearances from centre bounces (where opponents cannot create extras due to 6-6-6 positioning) and those from stoppages where those opposing extras are able to be involved:

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Let’s be honest here, the stoppage functionality of West Coast has been substandard in recent times. The club has done next to nothing to maximise the dominance of Naitanui, and continuously sets up in a way that fails to accommodate that the opponent is positioning extras around it. What we get is non-accountability of opposition player runs and mismatches that are desirable to the opposition and harmful to the Eagles.

Back to the tape again:


This is from a centre bounce, where the stoppage game of the team is usually at its strongest – however, Naitanui is not there in the ruck, Vardy is. Sheed on Selwood is a terrible match-up, with Selwood easily out-positioning him to win the clearance. Smith has a free run on goal away from Brander, but Selwood opts to handball to Stanley who is also free after Vardy makes a chase on the ball. Guthrie is able to provide support and move the ball into attack, despite starting off the back of the stoppage, because Redden fails to run with him. Gaff makes a decision to seagull outside of 50, when he could have easily moved into a position that would have prevented Henry from being able to come back inside for the successful shot on goal.

Barrass is placed in an uncomfortable match-up with Smith at the stoppage – he isn’t interested in getting the ball or notices the channel that has opened up behind him. Bontempelli out-positions Yeo and hits the channel, winning the clearance. Meanwhile, Redden abandons his counterpart in Macrae to close off the channel. With the bait taken, Liberatore and Weightman block out Eagles players on the other side of the stoppage to ensure Macrae has plenty of time to slot the goal after receiving Bontempelli’s handball.

Gaff does not follow McLean to the stoppage resulting in Smith becoming unmarked in the most likely area of the ruck tap from English. With Bontempelli and Shuey cancelling each other out, the Bulldogs open a channel for Smith to run through and take the clearance. Bulldogs defenders push up unopposed to support the clearance and move the ball into attacking 50. Bontempelli then takes Shuey and half the Eagles backline to the cleaners in an outstanding display of explosiveness and skill to finish with a goal.

This is just awful. Starting with Sheed being out-bodied by Adams and then stepping back from the contest. Redden being sucked in by the ball and allowing his player to become the clearance outlet. Gaff playing as a sweeper but doing nothing to prevent De Goey from running free after Yeo gets blocked by Grundy. West getting caught out in between and not affecting anything. O’Neill inexcusably letting Crisp get 15 metres on him when they were standing side-by-side seconds earlier. Hurn incapable of moving up the ground quickly to cover a player like Thomas. After that, the goal was certain.



The club finally has appointed a stoppage coach going into 2022, so perhaps this area will belatedly improve – however decisive improvement around stoppages will not occur until the defensive approach of the entire team is revolutionised.
 
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2.5 - Fading Away

One of the greatest frustrations and sources of angst for Eagles’ supporters in recent times is that no lead is seemingly guaranteed. The most infamous example being last year in Round 4, where the club was leading 81-48 halfway through the third quarter and then conceded 8 goals unanswered to lose the match.


We all knew something was very wrong when this happened…


The club continues to obsessively select squads that are overly tall, yet attempts to deploy a gameplan that is intensely demanding in terms of aerobic requirement, placing further demand upon a midfield which has been struggling in its conditioning.


This is the same side to side passage of play against the Bulldogs that was highlighted earlier. Look at how much ground Sheed covers here just to receive the ball wide on the wing. All that is happening here is fatigue build-up for zero gain in output.


It is a recipe for a dropoff in output (both offensively and defensively) to occur during matches.

Should it really be any surprise then when the club concedes so many easy points late in matches?

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Opponents were able to burst out of the blocks against West Coast in 2021 as the system allows them to dominate possession. In response, the Eagles invariably move additional numbers defensively up the ground to fill in holes, chase space and rally briefly; but all the extra effort in chasing shadows wears the team down, leaving the opponent free to re-gain dominance of possession during later stages – this time however, with much lower pressure being applied against them, the opponent is able to convert that dominance into easy goals on the scoreboard.

West Coast placed in the bottom four amongst clubs for points conceded during last quarters in 2021. The Eagles let through 200 more points in fourth quarters than did premiers Melbourne.

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West Coast has the second-oldest playing list in the competition, with a ruckman that averages less than 70% time on ground, combined with a playing squad that incorporates 6-7 other key talls, in addition to playing a host of players returning from long-term injuries…

And yet the approach is to somehow out-work the opponent and close out space, primarily through aerobic effort, in order to pin them down and gain territorial superiority.

Running is simply not a strength of this West Coast team, especially so when selection keeps finding places for unnecessary numbers of key-sized players – so expecting it to cover more ground than the opponent as a means of maintaining defensive cohesion is utterly foolish – and unfortunately will more often than not, lead to a continuance of the disappointing outcomes that typified the latter half of 2021.

No amount of additional effort will turn Naitanui into an 85% time on ground ruckman, much like getting Langdon to run 14km+ up the ground chasing grass won’t help the team to win ground balls in attack.

It is one thing to work hard, gut run and show effort – but if that extra effort leads to little in outcome other than early fatigue which allows the opponent to take hold of the game – then it just becomes dumb football.

Unless the playing squad selection becomes more balanced and the aerobic demand of the system is lessened, there is nothing to suggest that West Coast will address its issues relating to premature fadeout during matches in 2022.



2.6 - (It Doesn't Smell Like) Team Spirit

Four years ago, the club famously fought its way from a 5 goal deficit to win the premiership. There was a belief that regardless of the situation, the playing group could regain ascendancy and ultimately win the match.

We all know what happened next.


That seems like a lifetime ago.

Now, rather than finding the resolve to fight on, once an opponent gains a dominant run of momentum, the Eagles just give in.

Just once during 2021 (in Round 13 against Richmond) did West Coast turn a half time deficit into a win.

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The team is now barely capable of winning unless it is front-running.


Aside from the tactical and technical deficiencies, there is something that is not “right” from a mental perspective in the playing group. Whether it be disharmony between players, a reluctance to travel, or disillusionment with the tactics or coaching – it is without question having a negative impact upon performance, particularly under pressure.

It leaves a worrying fragility in the current team that does not align with success.
 
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Part III - Question Marks


3.1 - The Coach


Adam Simpson is now about to enter his ninth season in charge of West Coast. His tenure has overseen 114 wins at a 63% rate and has included two Grand Final appearances and the 2018 premiership.

That success has made him one of the highest profile coaches in the competition – yet he is now probably under more pressure to perform coming into 2022 than any other coach.

A future mortgaged for unrealised gains combined with an unwillingness to acknowledge tactical redundancy has left him with little room for any misstep this season.

The critical question now is how willing is Simpson to swallow his pride on tactical application and take onboard input from the new assistants when it comes to change? How the coming season plays out will depend entirely upon this answer.


Thus far, at no point in his time at the Eagles has Simpson demonstrated that he is willing to concede on his preference for a possessive gameplan with deep anchored defence.

With that in mind, a Damascene conversion in terms of system and approach appears highly unlikely.



Either way, this season an era shall be ending. The gameplan will be dumped for something new or the coach will be.


The shadow of Clarkson will loom large this year. The club’s administration made a massive play for him in 2013 and no doubt already have an action plan ready to execute should the first half of the season go poorly.

For all its glory and triumph, the Simpson-era now stands at the precipice of a humbling end in an overture of media speculation of a replacement in waiting.
 
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3.2 - The Midfield

As can be seen from the following tables, the midfield contingent is currently not delivering in ways that would be expected.

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Average statistic totals for the club and opposition when players featured. Going by these, Ah Chee may have a case to argue against being delisted.
Note the low positions occupied by many of the first-choice midfield.



In the six matches that Yeo and Shuey featured together in during 2021, West Coast had a 1-5 record.

So how does a midfield featuring Yeo, Kelly, Shuey, Gaff, Sheed and Redden in support to the best stoppage player in the competition in Naitanui get beaten so comprehensively by opponents on a consistent basis?


Positioning, pressure and pace.


As mentioned previously, West Coast position the midfield incredibly defensively in comparison to other clubs. To put it very simply, it is hard to make an impact upon the midfield when you are being used like a defender.

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This leads to the next point. With the midfield exiled behind the ball, the amount of pressure applied to key areas in the forward half that lead to goalscoring opportunities from turnover is non-existent. Not only does this severely weaken the primary scoring avenue for the team (as it is for all teams in the competition), it also provides the opposition with more time for decision-making and execution of disposal going into their own attack.

Compounding this issue is that two of the first-choice midfield group are completely useless when it comes to defence of any kind: Sheed and Gaff. They don’t tackle, drift off rather than mark an opposing counterpart, and get outbodied by the slightest amount of physical engagement.

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There is an argument that could be had to what value does having two such players in the same team really add?

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Sheed in particular is only purposeful in his output when he plays as an exclusively one-way player without the need for defensive responsibility. Around stoppages he should only ever be positioned ahead of the ball – never behind where he presents too much of a liability.


Sheed is at his best when he doesn’t need to defend.



Finding a way that retains defensive cohesion whilst integrating Sheed and Gaff and getting the midfield as a unit to occupy attacking areas of the ground more regularly will go a long way to creating additional pressure upon the opposition – and that will result in a far more competitive outcome in the middle than what has been seen from the team in recent times.

The Kelly Konundrum
It cannot be denied. The recruitment of Kelly to West Coast has proven to be a spectacular failure. Brought in at considerable cost to be the final piece of the puzzle in restoring premiership glory, he has failed to replicate his form from Geelong, whilst the club’s on-field performance has progressively worsened since his arrival.​
From 2015 onwards, West Coast have featured 40 players to have played more than 20 matches – in terms of win percentage Kelly ranks in at 39th of 40 – only ahead of Brander.​
Player-Win-Percentage.jpg
It should go without saying that something drastically wrong is going on here – Kelly remains an exceptionally talented player, but his value is not being realized in blue and gold.​
Kelly kicked 48 goals in two seasons with Geelong. In two seasons at the Eagles, he has managed to kick just 11. Never has he kicked multiple goals in a match for West Coast.​
Let’s rewind things a bit – back to Kelly’s last game with the Cats, the 2019 Preliminary Final against Richmond. Here he kicked 3.1 to go with his 31 disposals, almost single-handedly keeping his team in the contest.​
So how did those goals come about?​

He is either starting ahead of the ball, or running to positions ahead of the ball.​
Using Kelly as a strictly on-ball midfielder is limiting his output by not using him in the most damaging way. He is at his best when placed ahead of the ball, making runs back towards it. Kelly is elite at finding and exploiting channels in and behind opposing defences. Whilst he lacks the size to act as a false key forward like Martin, Bontempelli or Stringer, his ability to find space and create opportunity whilst covering so much ground makes him a nightmare match-up between midfield and attack.​
Stop with behind the ball nonsense. Release Kelly from those shackles of negativity to get forward and we shall rediscover the player that the club traded a king’s ransom for.​


The final aspect is pace. The West Coast midfield has none of it. Four years ago, Yeo and Shuey were able to provide that ability to break through defensive lines and cause worry in opposing ranks. Injury has since cruelled both however, with no injection of pace coming in to remedy the situation.

It leaves the club looking terribly one-paced and ponderously slow when in possession, and highly vulnerable to opposing counterattacks. It’s Priddis, Mitchell and 2017 all over again – except the rest of the team is now older and the talent underneath is far lesser.

Getting more pace through the middle will provide both a point of difference and alternate route for moving the ball forward into attack – the problem for the club is the options here are thoroughly limited.


And before anyone suggests as much, Duggan is not the solution:





If the club can address those three areas concerning positioning, pressure and pace, the West Coast midfield will take on a radically different look and start to deliver upon its on-paper potential.
 
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3.3 - The Attack

This used to be something that could be relied upon without question. The club had the advantage of the strongest forward line in the competition. A weapon with so much potency that even when provided with fewer scoring opportunities, West Coast would still win matches comprehensively.

In future, we shall look back and marvel at an attack that included what is likely to be four of the club’s top six goal scorers in its history.

But that unquestionable forward power is no more. The efficiency that allowed for cracks in other areas of the team to be papered over has steadily waned over the years.

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With Darling’s recent ninja-flip on vaccination, the club has narrowly avoided a circumstance where the fate of the forward line would have rested upon the shoulders of a player that will be 35 years old before the season ends.

Simply put, an on-field absence from Darling for the season would have left a massive void impossible to fill:

Darling-Goals-CMarks.jpg

His return from self-imposed exile does not diminish issues in the key forward stocks however. Missing the preseason due to vaccine-gate will leave him in poor condition and prone to injury. Kennedy, as mentioned earlier will turn 35 during the season. Allen threatens to be an heir apparent, but his proneness to injury is becoming increasingly worrisome. The forward craft of B.Williams has failed to develop much at all in the years since he was drafted and the club appears to be giving Waterman the Brander treatment this year. That the club is poised to use SSP selection Dixon for at least the first month of the coming season is telling enough in itself.

Just getting Darling back will not be enough to solve problems up forward of course – he played all 22 games last year after all. Unless a radical shift in approach occurs, the forward line can only be expected to repeat its recent failings again in 2022.


The Magic Hat
Rioli is just magic, he wears a magic hat
And when the Eagles need a goal, he says “I fancy that”
Rioli is just holy, don’t you all agree?
The Tiwi man of miracles, with Gatorade for pee
Rioli has been flying, we’re happy that he’s back
Even when caught smuggling drugs, he cannot get the sack
Rioli is just magic, he wears a magic hat
Blocking Maynard for Sheed’s goal, a premiership format
Let’s bring that win percentage table back again:​
Player-Win-Percentage-Rioli.jpg
Look who is there at the top of the pile – Willie Rioli.​
Perhaps the answer to many of the club’s woes has been sitting right in front of it all this time. Over 900 days have passed since Rioli last featured in an AFL match. The same amount of time has passed since the Eagles have won a finals match. The two are not independent of each other – Rioli is one of those rare players that acts like a rising tide, lifting the output of all those around him.​
Look no further than the following chart, no other player correlates so strongly when it comes to availability and success.​
WCE-Stoppages-2018-21.jpg
Half-Year moving averages
Blue line = Centre Clearances
Orange line = Stoppage Clearances
Whenever Rioli has managed to accumulate more than 15 disposals in a game, the Eagles have never lost.​
His fitness, as could be expected of a player that has missed so much football, is still a long way off from where it needs to be and will likely remain a work in progress throughout the season ahead. Even with that against him, there is no player capable of sparking the rest of the squad this year like Rioli.​



How many goals did B.Williams and Vardy kick between them last year from their combined 15 games? Just 8.

They never featured together – every single one of those 15 appearances was as a secondary ruckman to Naitanui – meaning they spent the majority of their time on the ground not in the ruck, and doing a poor attempt at pretending to be a forward.

It poses the question of why does the club keep persisting with secondary ruck-forward combinations when they have been nothing but completely ineffectual since 2018? Surely there are better ways to facilitate support to Naitanui than playing a witches’ hat up forward for half of the match.

In 18 of 22 matches played in 2021, the West Coast attack featured at least four key-sized players [i.e. 4+ from Kennedy, Darling, Allen, Waterman, Vardy and Williams] for the majority of the match. This is a repeated obsession that still remains despite all the evidence pointing out its continued failure. The top-heavy attack allows opponents to rebound out of defence far too easily.

2021-OppR50-Perc.jpg

The club had a win-loss record of 7-11 from those 18 matches. Conversely, the remaining 4 matches had a record of 3-1. It is time to let go of the “Land of the Giants” absurdity once and for all – the team performs better when it plays with a smaller forward line.


Speaking of which, the small forward options are enviable. Ryan, Rioli, Cripps and Jones form an impressive quartet, with Petruccelle, Langdon and Winder providing ample depth. Add in Kelly and Petrevski-Seton rotating from the midfield and you get a mosquito fleet in attack that is capable of delivering a very nasty bite.

The club has been faced with the prospect of a key-position crisis up forward – to me it presents an opportunity to reduce the size of the forward line and put that talented group of smalls to use.
 
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3.4 - The Defence

The foundation behind the club’s past success is perhaps now its greatest problem. The deep-anchored zone setup for intercepts no longer serves its purpose and actively concedes territory to the opponent. The result is a circumstance that has been deteriorating over the years.

2021-WCE-MG-Diff.jpg

The obvious answer is to become more proactive in defence, rather than waiting for the opponent. Finding a way to implement that with the limitations of the squad however, is another matter.

The lack of pace in the back half is both ominous and unsettling. Forget about pace coming out of defence to assist ball movement for a moment – I have grave concerns about the ability of this team to transition defensively when the opposition is presented with a counterattacking opportunity. Only Rotham could be judged as being genuinely quick – which is unfortunate because his ground-level one-on-one skills are terrible. With Sheppard retiring, the club no longer has a reliable shutdown option that can be deployed against opposing small forwards.

There is a reason why Petruccelle tears it up each preseason during the intraclub matches – the club doesn’t have much available to contain a player of his type.

I fear that regardless of the tactical approach, West Coast will not be able adequately restrain opponents from getting behind the defence and causing havoc on transition.


Million Dollar Baby
No player sums up the current malaise in the West Coast Eagles as does Jeremy McGovern. In the space of a few years, he has gone from being viewed as arguably the most influential player in the competition to an unaccountable defensive liability. As teams adapted to curtail the intercept game, his productivity has dropped.​
Opponents have continued to sharpen their approach – going shorter with disposal and creating positional uncertainty by leading key forwards well up the ground whilst pushing rucks deep into attack.​
It has left McGovern with a defensive dilemma – stay with your direct opponent and get dragged out of the defensive equation, or zone off and attempt to cover the opposing ruck that is getting forward on Naitanui. Pretty standard fare for key defenders at AFL level now. It all begins to unravel however when the following occurs:​
  • The ball moves into attack faster than he can respond
  • Opposing players position themselves in the direct path between McGovern and opposition key marking targets, further reducing his ability to quickly impact marking contests
  • Forwards lead into the space created 30-40 metres from goal when McGovern tracks the opposing ruckman to the goalsquare.
It leads to a vicious negative feedback loop, where McGovern loses his confidence and becomes increasingly hesitant to move early, which reduces his ability to impact contests, which in turn erode confidence further and so on it goes until the most expensive player in the squad is no longer able to be of any benefit to it.​

Here we see McGovern not having confidence in Duggan to provide assistance to Barrass against Larkey and Thomas. Instead of defending Goldstein’s lead, he ends up in no-man’s-land when Duggan comes across to mark Thomas.
Obviously a major key to improving the fortunes of the team is restoring McGovern to his former position of dominance. The answer to that however, has eluded the club for the past three years.​
Look again at those three points of unravelling listed above – rapid ball movement, blocks, and getting baited by the opposition ruck decoy. All three are contingent upon team-mates delivering elsewhere to prevent the circumstance from occurring – be it midfielders covering the corridor; fellow defenders preventing their counterparts from laying blocks; or rucks staying accountable to their opponent. In recent times those team-mates have not been delivering on their part of the bargain, which has caused McGovern to develop a severe distrust of his colleagues.​
Rather than having confidence in his team-mates to fulfill their role, McGovern now plays in anticipation of their failure and tries to take it upon himself to do everything across the backline – an impossible and futile undertaking that ironically sees him being caught out of position more often.​
Getting McGovern to narrow his defensive focus and step back from trying to intervene all over the place will go a long way to regaining credibility in his efforts down back. The wider issues relating to those points of unravelling however, can only be truly addressed by a comprehensive change in system. That is not to say a strong team cannot be built around an intercepting defence anymore – on the contrary, the current reigning premiers have demonstrated just how effective one can be when paired with the right tactical approach.​


Attempting to address the defensive setup places West Coast in a catch-22 situation: sit deep and get cut to ribbons by the short possession game or push higher and risk getting exposed out the back.

In the end, and somewhat depressingly, it may just be a case that the club does not have the resources in the squad to prevent either outcome from occurring.
 
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Part IV - Off the Field

The injuries we do and those we suffer are seldom weighed in the same scales - Aesop

4.1 - A Terrible Interlude

The summer of discontent has become an autumn of alarm.

After watching from the sidelines to see the Demons break their premiership drought under western skies, the club jumped into offseason proceedings, apology letters, and list management before uppercutting itself in the Brander fiasco. Jarrod Cameron departed without any explanation and Vozzo took leave without a replacement.

Better yet, the club couldn’t even get the registration of its own NGA players in order. By going at pick 10, Erasmus was ineligible for NGA bid matching in the end – saving the club from an embarrassing situation. Well run clubs don’t make mistakes like that.
A former pick 6 in Petrevski-Seton was traded in from Carlton for a packet of chips but that was overshadowed by the revelation that the club was so tight for cap space that it couldn’t even afford Vardy.

With its first opening round pick since 2017, the club selected a player that had played barely three matches in the previous two years – melts ensued. It wasn’t until pick 62 that an inside midfielder was selected in mature-ager G.Clark – and he was injured as well.


Elsewhere the assistants were turned over, with Graham and Hickmott making way and high-profile recruits Schofield and Knights coming in from Port Adelaide and Geelong respectively to provide input to gameplan development.

Fitness had been identified as a key area that needed improvement – so whilst the east coast isolated with Covid – the Eagles continued to run in the hottest summer on record, chasing kilometres upon grounds that were baked hard like concrete.

Considering the club’s recent history with injuries, it’s easy to see with hindsight that this was a recipe for disaster.

2022-WCE-Injury-List.jpg

There are currently eight lower leg injuries on the list.

You would have thought that with the resources available to it, that the club would have figured out how to soften up the training ground by now, given this has been an ongoing issue for years.

And now, on top of that, Covid is impacting the team just as the season is about to start.

There are barely 25 players available to select from. What should have been a soft start to the season is turning into a nightmare.



4.2 - Composition

The squad turnover from 2021 to 2022 is as follows:

2021-PostSEason-Ins-Outs.jpg

The club has taken steps towards addressing an age gap that was forming in the squad, adding a further ten players, all of whom are under 25 years old.


Performance curves, based from Player Ratings, look like this for each position:



Performance curves:
Coloured lines are overlayed growth curves 2015-2021
  • Green equates to elite
  • Blue equates to A-B grade
  • Yellow equates to C grade
Dark blue dots denote best average rating over 8 matches from the past 30 months
Light blue dots denote where statistic base for the player is low and highly variable
Red dots denote players that have left.
Small blue dots denote the current competition distribution as of Round 1, 2022.

Speculative glances on the future composition of the squad indicate that its quality will fall off a cliff within two seasons without major intervention.
WCE-Future-Composition.png


4.3 - Room for Improvement

Let’s be honest – the best of this team is in the rear-view mirror. The squad continues to age and now includes nine players who will be above 30 before this season ends. It could be argued the final outcome of the club last season is also reflective of this – still good enough to account for opponents at the bottom end, but incapable of competing against those above it.

2021-WCE-Record-Top8-Bottom9.jpg

The maximum potential output of the overall team is in decline. But that isn’t to say the only way forward this year is further down, or indeed to tread water – the club underwhelmed to such an extreme extent in 2021 that despite a lower ceiling, there remains a substantial level of on-field improvement that can be attained in 2022.

Even a relatively modest restoration of output across the squad will result in a sizeable improvement in performance from the team.

Sam Petrevski-Seton comes in as an unfulfilled talent after six seasons at Carlton. If he delivers on that promise in his new environment, then he without question will be the recruit of the season and impart a massive influence that is beneficial to the team. Likewise, Rioli is effectively a new recruit after missing the entirety of the past two seasons

In all, there are 8 players under 25 years of age in the squad which have played 20+ senior matches – that is where the bulk of improvement this year can be expected to come from. Mature draftees West and Clark, in addition to the four recently added SSP selections, form another solid group between the ages of 22 and 25 that could be expected to provide some improve improvement also. Then there is always room for a bolter from the younger ranks, be it O’Neill, Edwards, Williams, Hough or Chesser (if he can ever get on the field to play).

The club will definitely see improvement in areas this year. Whether that improvement is enough to overcome the regression elsewhere from aging members however remains to be seen.
 
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Part V - An Approach for 2022

Better to die on your feet, than live on your knees – Emiliano Zapata


As described previously at length, the club will not achieve any form of success this season if it maintains the same conservative approach from 2021.
With expansive tactics being favoured by the competition’s rule changes, a refusal to act decisively on this will impart a continuation of the form displayed after the bye last year.


The good news is that the club is thoroughly capable of executing such a shift.

Look no further than to Round 21 against the eventual premiers when play resumed after the lightning delay.


Redden here takes the more aggressive disposal option to hit West on the lead. This allows Cole to cut in as an inverse wing and create a chain of possession that easily slices through the Melbourne defence.

More West Coast numbers forward force the Melbourne defence to be accountable, which further opens up the corridor. With extra numbers forward, both the pressure applied on the opposition to force a turnover and the likelihood of an Eagles player being able to capitalise from one are greater.

How to aggressively press at a forward stoppage. Melbourne are surrounded by West Coast here – there is no way they can get a clean ball out in this circumstance. On the other hand, with so many players pressing forward, any loose ball here presents as a scoring opportunity for West Coast.
Where was this during the rest of the season?!


Granted, Melbourne had one foot on the plane already and West Coast benefited from the additional break – but the approach here is that of a completely different team. Rather than sitting back, there is an aggressive press swarming the forward line with numbers. Rather than moving slow and wide, the halfbacks are cutting back inside and moving through the corridor with speed. It was fast, it was aggressive, it was risky – but it worked exceptionally well:

2021-R21-Q4-Stats.jpg

And yet a week later against Fremantle, the club reverted to its conservative ways.

An explanation for that eludes me – the club finally stumbled upon something convincing, then proceeded to not try it again.


This Eagles team can play differently – it’s about time we saw it more often.


The return of the press
Those familiar with my musings will be well aware of my preference for pressing tactics. Due to the shape of the playing ground, which narrows towards the goals, pressing tactics are far more efficient in AFL than practically any other team sport that is even mildly comparable.​
With a series of successive rule changes making it far easier to move the ball once in possession, pressing aggressively to minimise opposing possession chains before their initiation has become even more favourable.​
As could be expected then, the most successful clubs from last season deployed pressing tactics:​
2021-T50-Avs.jpg
Furthermore, with disposal now thoroughly weaponised once the ball is in any kind of space, approaches that deny that space from being available in the first instance are being rewarded in the contested game:​
2021-CP-Avs.jpg
This was arguably the clearest competition trend to come out of 2021 – the most effective template for success on the field is a comprehensive press. Clubs that fail to acknowledge that are handicapping themselves and tempting unnecessary failure.​



So, we now have a philosophy – how would one go about implementing it?

Back in August, you may recall I described the operation of a press here. Building upon that, here is a revised version for the coming season in the [unlikely] chance that we ever have a full squad to choose from:

WCE-Preferred-Tactics.jpg

A press anchored at half forward supersedes the redundant zone sitting in the defensive half.​
Attack:
A forward line that is mobile, maintains players ahead of ball, stretches the opposing defence and takes away the easy option for opponents to rebound out through the corridor.​
Just two of the forwards are key-sized – and resting rucks in attack have been banished – there is no “land of the giants” trash going on here. Similarly, any notion of a “Neo-Masten” aerobic sweeping defensive forward is dead, buried and cremated. This is emphasis on mobility, pressure and creativity – keeping these positions forward of centre at all times and ruthlessly turning opposition turnovers into scoring opportunity.​
The full forward remains deep near the goalsquare, granting them plenty of space to lead into and making any opposing defensive sweepers accountable.​
Positioned around CHF are attacking specialists, for both the immediate ground ball from marking contests and as overlapping secondary disposal options running in towards goal. One of those positions starts as a floater on the attacking side of forward half stoppages before going forward to hit the spillage drop zone of marking contests at pace – Sheed and Rioli are the perfect options to rotate through this attacking role. Another shall use the starting point ahead of the ball to attack the front end of stoppages and contests, acting as an additional attack-minded rover that is well-suited to get the best out of Kelly.​
Defence:
A back seven featuring a pair of inverse wingers that operates more as a back five for much of the time. The inverse wings start from defensive positions and run lanes through the corridor, offering additional offensive support to the midfield and greater capability in marking opposing players in the middle of the ground. These positions are workhorses, playing as surrogate midfielders, yet getting back defensively when required. Again, the emphasis is on offensive capability and taking possession, taking the game on and switching lanes quickly through good decisions and disposal. The way Sydney utilise similar positions to cover the corridor and transition into attack should be taken as the template here.​
Three talls in defence addresses the problem that is being presented by opposing ruckmen pushing forward aggressively to the goalsquare – for example, the third tall can shift across to the ruck, leaving McGovern and Barrass to focus upon tracking a single opponent rather than worry about a mismatch occurring close to goal.​
When the opposing ruck is not moving into attack, the three key defensive talls can operate together to form an axis for the intercept marking of incoming disposal. The other advantage of this setup down back is they can be called upon to fulfill secondary ruck duties or a key forward rotation and keep the overall structure of the forward press from being changed.​
The emphasis here is to have a defence that is robust against incoming attacks, but also capable of transitioning possession quickly and feeding it through the corridor.​
Here I have McGovern assuming the secondary ruck role, and perhaps controversially placed Allen in defence over H.Edwards as the third tall due to his capability to rotate forward when Kennedy or Darling are resting. Alternatively, with Kennedy aging, if Allen is selected as full forward ahead of him, then H.Edwards would naturally take that third key defensive role.​
Midfield:
Highlighting the outright aggressiveness of this approach, the traditional wing positions function more like forwards, staying high and ahead of the ball, whilst providing width to what is otherwise a narrow forward line. They still track back defensively, but their primary instructions are to connect the midfield with the pressing attack and cut-off any diagonal kick from the opposition defence that is targeting the corridor.​
The rest of the midfield group keep narrow in their positioning, ensuring representation of numbers in dangerous areas in the middle of the ground. Dominance of the corridor, primarily through greater numbers, must be maintained – this dominance will allow the press to maximise scoring opportunity from opposition turnover and shield the defence from being caught out on transition so readily.​
When in possession, the instruction is to look for the lane runners in the middle to get the ball forward rather than bombing it without purpose.​


The above is without question a reckless approach to take, it really is all or nothing.

But, the team does not have the quality within it to execute half-measures and come out on top anymore.

The thin sliver of attaining success this year lies in getting a super-aggressive mindset, and having a belief that the quality of ground-level players the club has available to use up forward can out-do anything else the competition has on offer.

The club still has strong points – the list has not gone completely sour yet. Why not throw everything towards that advantage before the window completely closes? And should things not prevail as hoped, I would rather see the club go down swinging than roll over without putting up a fight.
 
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Part VI - The Season Ahead

I've seen the future and it's much like the present - only longer. - Dan Quisenberry



So what does 2022 ultimately have in store for West Coast?

We have seen that whilst the top level of potential output from the club shall continue to decline, there still remains the opportunity for significant improvement over 2021 if the right tactical approach can be applied in alignment with the areas of strength in the squad.

(That is of course, if the current injury crisis can come to an end).


Aside from personnel and tactics, the variability of the fixture plays a major role in the fortunes of clubs each year.

With that considered, what cards has the league administration dealt the club in the fixture for season 2022?


Here is the club’s fixture as it currently stands:

WCE-2022-Fixture-List.png

Not a terrible fixture. Of the five double-up matches, just one (Geelong) is against a top 8 team from last year.

Trips to Queensland (x2), Sydney and Geelong may as well be input as losses already however.

The Round 4 trip to Victoria against Collingwood just 6 days after the Derby is less than desirable as well.


When compared to the rest of the competition, the fixture for West Coast is the easiest of all clubs in terms of where opposing teams finished in 2021.


2022-Fixture-Opp-Strength-2021-Finish.jpg



Travel of course, particularly for the two WA clubs, is a factor as well. The club may have fared well for opposition strength, but shall be travelling more than any other in 2022.

2022-Fixture-Dist-Travelled.jpg


The AFL’s “dynamic” fixturing means we currently have no idea of day breaks between matches and their potential impacts after Round 9.
Nonetheless, here is chart of what I call ‘Fatigue Factor’ (calculated from day breaks and travel), with 7 day breaks input as default after Round 9.

2022-Fatigue-Factor.jpg
The two Grand Finalists from last year have an easier road than what would be expected.



With all of these factors considered, a tentative forecast for the coming season can be conducted.

Here is the output for last season, which proved to be surprisingly accurate in its prediction.

2021-Ladder-Forecast.jpg

The initial run of this forecast for 2022, prior to the injury crisis, had West Coast finishing 9th again with an 11-11 record.
With long-term injuries now factored in, the club is forecast here to come in at 14th with an 8-14 record.


2022-Ladder-Forecast-INJ3.png


This was already going to be a daunting season for West Coast, fighting against the rigors of increasing age and searching for tactical relevance.

The added misfortune of having to overcome such a large list of injuries is likely makes it a step too far now to consider any return to September action this year.

Outside of something radical and unexpected occurring, 2022 for the West Coast Eagles will be just making up the numbers and watching the contenders from the wrong end of the table.
 
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Some well put together previews here, backed up with a lot of knowledge and facts.

Great work boys.

Unfortunately anyone who thinks we can / are contending this year is delusional. This is only further compacted by our current injuries. We have virtually no depth or youth coming through the ranks (although last years draft crop look promising), not too mention Simpson is a stubborn campaigner and the game plan looks to have barely changed.


Barrass and Allen our two book ends for the next 8 years or so, we need to start filling in a lot of blanks at the draft/ trade table. Kelly, sheed and yeo will be 31, 30 and 32 in four years time.
Hopefully we can make a play for a flag just before they retire.

Happy to be proven wrong but let’s see how this year unfolds.
 
Not really. He played 22 games and was probably our 2nd best midfielder overall.

Just cause he got possessions and kicked a few goals on occasion doesn’t mean he was good. He’s totally unaccountable, a defensive liability, a horrendous hand baller and always burns a player running past. I mean he has a nice kick in space
 
I think I got RSI from scrolling through the last two pages, but I appreciate the time and effort you both put into your analyses.

I look forward to the next episode ‘Episode IX: The Rise of Non-walkers’.
 
2.3 - Ball Movement

The method based around possession retention through kicking and marking (particularly contested marking) is redundant.

Increasingly it has become nothing more than an exercise in attempting to control possession without making any territorial gain, which is completely pointless. As we fans are all too aware, and much to our frustration, West Coast will voluntarily lose territory not just once, but multiple times in a match, trying to manufacture a slow switch in play that will never open up the opposing defence and only results in additional pressure being placed upon the Eagles’ own defence that was completely unnecessary.


The indirect, slow and tortured ball movement from West Coast contrasts with the direct approach taken by the Bulldogs – no guesses which team played in last season’s Grand Final.

No other club in the entire competition exhibits such risky activity that is so lacking in reward.


This situation is primarily due to a lack of available options to kick to as the West Coast forwards are spending so much time up the ground to cover space defensively that they are often unavailable as offensive targets ahead of the ball. Thus, we encounter the all-too-familiar scenario, typified by slow, predictable ball movement that poses little threat to the opposing defence – ranking dead last of all teams for generating scores from the defensive half.

This also of course diminishes the chances of capitalising upon counterattacking opportunities when they are presented.


Insufficient numbers in the forward half of the ground abort a counterattacking chance. Instead, Geelong are able to utilise superior numbers to launch their own attacking transition to much greater effect.


It gets worse however – the want to retain possession leads to conservatism in possession. Rather than pursuing aggressive scoring avenues through the corridor, it lends to selecting options out wide on the wing where the risk appears to be lower. This is a dangerous mistake.

In a circumstance where the opponent is already generating midfield spares to neutralise both Naitanui and the zone, taking possession wide all but guarantees giving away supremacy of the corridor to the opposition in the event of a turnover.

Time for some examples:


West Coast go wide from the kick-in – note Miers taking up a position well off the mark that prevents Witherden from being a useable handball option. Whilst the Eagles shift to the wing, Geelong stacks the corridor in anticipation of a turnover opportunity. When the turnover does come the defence is left helpless and Geelong get an easy goal.

This embarrassing passage of play typifies how the club often plays into the hands of the opponent through its ball use. Three times in quick succession the wrong decision was made in attempting to bring the ball out of defence - the third resulting in a goal for Sydney.

Here the Eagles are trying to move the ball quicker, but Yeo and then Hurn go wide rather than attack the corridor against the bottom-placed team in the competition. This results in the Kangaroos gaining superior numbers in the middle of the ground, which are put to damaging use when Kelly turns the ball over under pressure.


It wasn't by chance that the club ranked 17th for metres gained and dead last in defensive 50 to attacking 50 possession chains.

Rather than the current method of sitting back and allowing the opponent to comfortably setup, the club should be getting players ahead of the ball, to stretch the opposing defence and provide those defenders with something to be worried about that creates uncertainty in terms of their positioning – doing that is how you create the opportunity for swift and direct ball movement that can tear a team to pieces.

This is a great breakdown on why we were so shit. It made me really angry to see how most of our problems were from terrible coaching. Simmo really deserved to get the sack for letting this rot set in. If he doesn't turn it around this year then they need to cut losses.

It is sad to think how much of this talent has been wasted from some of the worst coaching in the league.
 
Geez - dont think we will miss Sheed much. Those Dylan82 videos show how poor he was last year.

I said that when he got injured too. With a fit list he's not in my B22. Did cop some push back about his finish in the JW medal but I think he achieved that based on durability with a sprinkling of good games.

He wasn't always bad, in fact he was quite dangerous in a few games, but the gulf between his best and worst is huge.
 

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Preview 2022 AFL Season West Coast Eagles Preview, Fixtures and how the club can contend in 2022 despite injury woes. More from Dylan82 on the second page.


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