Anzac Gallipoli gatherings misguided, Keating says

[TheBloods]

That depends on your definition of important. Put it this way: if you took the Australian Corps out of the Amiens attack (keeping in mind it was one of three corps) and replaced it with another, would it still have succeeded? Yes, of course - perhaps not with the same level of success, but that would have as much to do with the fact any replacement corps would have less troops because Australian divisions were larger than their British counterparts and there were five of them in the corps. If Billy Hughes had chucked a tantrum and pulled the AIF in July 1918, would the Allies still have forced an armistice by November 1918? Yes.

Australians can be justifiably proud that in the space of four years a nation with virtually no professional army to speak of had raised and trained a (proportionally) large force that was, by 1918, one of the elite formations in the war. Monash was a superb general who lead his men well and possessed a great understanding of the nature of combat in the trenches. That should be enough - but for some reason people feel the need to one-up it and overstate the importance of the Australians on the Western Front.

One of the problems of your counterfactual is that there were no other meaningful formations to fill in for the Australians. And a normal line unit would not have been a perfect substitute - as Sheffield and Terraine note the Australians were an elite unit. It is also noted that Australian divisions were 7000 the same as the British, but smaller than the Canadians which were 12000.

The Australians neither won the war themselves nor stopped the Germans single-handedly, but they played an important role in the British line, as did the other Dominion forces.

 

[thejester]

Essentially, it's unnecessary to argue about the importance of the battle of Hamel, or for that matter Amiens, in terms of their contribution to the ultimate outcome of the war. It was Monash's thought and tactics which made him a great general.

I don't deny that Monash was a great general, but again there's this undercurrent to your post that he was somehow unique in his ideas. As Petersen points out, two weeks after Hamel the French assaulted along the Marne, using en masse an almost identical tactical forumla - infantry, supported by tanks and a rolling barrage, with no preparatory fires. This was not them simply copying Monash, but a result of their own tactical experience.

The use of tanks with attendant infantry (who were thus much more protected during the assaults), the creeping artillery barrages, the use of aircraft, the planning in minutest detail and the extraordinary administrative accomplishments are what made these battles of interest. It has been said that Monash's tactics here were the precursor of the blitzkrieg employed by the Germans so effectively some twenty years later.

Which just shows their own detatchment from reality. Monash's tactics were just that: tactics, designed to solve a tactical problem. Blitzkrieg was a combination of tradtional Prussian military principles and the new battlefield mobility provided by armour.

One of the problems of your counterfactual is that there were no other meaningful formations to fill in for the Australians. And a normal line unit would not have been a perfect substitute - as Sheffield and Terraine note the Australians were an elite unit.

Again, the Fourth Army attack was made by three corps, one of which was a regular British unit. There had been nothing 'elite' about the French and American units which used similar tactics to similar effect on the Marne, and historians like Sheffield have argued vocally that most British divisions actually did as well as their Dominion counterparts.

It is also noted that Australian divisions were 7000 the same as the British, but smaller than the Canadians which were 12000.

I thought by 1918 that British brigades were down to three battalions, but that doesn't seem to be the case - and you're right in that counting bayonets is probably a better measure of their strength in any case.

 

[TheBloods]

I agree with Sheffield that the British soldiers and commanders are generally underrated and fought well, but there was still a gap in the line in 1918 without the Australians, and the Australian and Canadian divisions were equivalent to the elite units (e.g. the Guards) in the British forces.

 

[XFactor1979]

i was listening to a society, religion and politics show the other night and they had someone in as guest discussing about the myth of anzac day

for one the anzacs did not go to war to fight to uphold the values of today to make a better world as such, instead the anzacs went there on the back of the british government's best interests

another aspect raised is where has the anti-war movement gone with regards to anzac day? does anybody know that war is a terrible thing? whatever happened to "Peace man"? it seems like anzac day is almost pro-war

 

[TheBloods]

That sounds like Henry Reynolds on Q&A. He made some interesting points, but he goes too far and distorts the arguments. Peter Cosgrove successfully tackled him on a number of issues (such as similar misguided points as above like it being pro-war or the political backstory).

 

[Dawson]

Keating said:

"On all the evidence since, I think it is reasonable to say that Churchill did overcook the arguments in favour of a naval and infantry campaign against Turkey in the Dardanelles Straits, with the object of control of Constantinople, the modern Istanbul. It is even worth arguing, that Churchill drove the Turks into the arms of the Germans when he requisitioned and seized control of the two dreadnought battleships which the Turks had ordered from British yards and had already paid for.

Indeed, it may even have been that a phalanx of British battleships both old and new was unable to take out the Turkish forts. It was certainly true that control of the Gallipoli peninsula was not capable of realisation without infantry and that the Turks had been put on red alert when Britain had earlier tried to mine the mouth of the Dardanelles.

They did produce Gallipoli. But with the Western Front in a quagmire and standstill and given Australian loyalties to king and country, it was entirely explicable that we would be there to help, including at Gallipoli.

So our motivations were, divided by nationalism and imperialism; between loyalties to the empire and a desire for a more independent Australia. Importantly, Churchill’s ambivalence about Australia was a mirror image of Australia’s ambivalence about itself.

On the one hand we were out to prove that the British race in the antipodes had not degenerated yet we resented being dragooned into a war which did not threaten our own country or its people.

In an almost theological sense Australian Britons had been born again into the baptism of fire at Anzac Cove, questioning, somewhat tongue in cheek, whether we needed being reborn at all.

The reborn part went to a lack of confidence and ambivalence about ourselves. Who we were and what we had become. If our sons suffered and died valiantly in a European war, such sacrifice was testament to the nation’s self worth.

In some respects we are still at it; not at the suffering and the dying, but still turning up at Gallipoli, the place where Australia was needily redeemed?

The truth is that Gallipoli was shocking for us. Dragged into service by the imperial government in an ill conceived and poorly executed campaign, we were cut to ribbons and dispatched.

And none of it in the defence of Australia. Without seeking to simplify the then bonds of empire and the implicit sense of obligation, or to diminish the bravery of our own men, we still go on as though the nation was born again or even, was redeemed there. An utter and complete nonsense.

For these reasons I have never been to Gallipoli and I never will."

 

[TheBloods]

As Cosgrove said, there is too much distraction into the political side. ANZAC day is about the sacrifice and bravery of the men and their stoicism and mateship in the face of such horrors.

Keating's comments are off the mark in a number of areas.

 

[AndSmithMustScore]

instead the anzacs went there on the back of the british government's best interests

I thought they went there on the back of most of them volunteering.

It's not like the British conscripted them.

Most went there for an adventure. Naive sure, but for a lot that was the best chance they'd get to go explore the world they thought at the time.

 

[TheBloods]

And also because they thought of themselves as British. Dismissing these views is anachronistic.

 

[The J Dog]

The impression I got when I loved in London was that the vast majority of Aussie Ex-Pats bound for Turkey every April saw it as little more than a party junket.

I went in 1999 with about 10,000 other Aussie and NZ expats from London. There was a definite lack of respect on show from at least a few hundred visitors e.g. lying down on the graves at Lone Pine, lots of people there pissed.

People couldn't turn around without seeing another backpacker they knew from London, so it did have a festive atmosphere to it. If you want it to be a sombre, reflective experience then go at any time other than ANZAC Day.

 

[AndSmithMustScore]

And also because they thought of themselves as British. Dismissing these views is anachronistic.

True enough.

This stands out more when you consider a large portion of those who didn't volunteer were of Irish heritage.

And they refused to fight for the crown,