- Jun 26, 2011
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- West Coast
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- Perth Wildcats, Perth Lynx
Twenty-seven months on and apart from a global pandemic, little has changed which has led to a continuance of disappointment and underachievement in the on-field performance of the club.
Frustratingly, much of what is stated within the OP of this thread could have been written today, as the concerns raised remain valid and are preventing this team from achieving its true potential.
So how does one of the best teams on paper in the competition repeatedly end up with such an embarrassing output?
The unfortunate answer is that the club today has by far the worst tactical setup that I have ever seen from any team that is chasing a finals position.
It is at once compromised in both defence and attack and tries to remediate that by running the midfield into the ground, hampering the ability of that group to impact significantly during the latter part of matches.
Time to revisit how this absurdity evolved.
Looking back
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it – George Santayana
Rather than just walking over old ground, I’ll refer to where it has been described previously:
And that takes us to 2021, approaching the season with a gameplan that had overwhelmingly pruned back its offensive capability to maintain defensive cohesion in the face of opposing counterattacks.
Then, of course, the rules changed. Turning the mark into a witches’ hat turbocharged how teams could move the ball forward quickly, especially out of the defensive half. Any clubs already vulnerable to quick transition were set to become cannon fodder if they failed to adapt.
The rule changes did not flip over the table and fundamentally change the game – they just accelerated a process towards more direct ball movement that was already underway; a process that over time increasingly placed the club at odds with the rest of the competition.
Opponents came to learn that creating an outnumber through the corridor and linking disposal to shorter targets, rather than kicking long, rips apart the defensive zone of West Coast, creating an easy avenue to goal. Warning signs have been there for over the past two years – the difference now is that every opponent each week is actively working to undo the club through this soft underbelly.
With the benefit of hindsight, the reluctance to modify the system in both directions was a time bomb that was always going to explode eventually once individual brilliance was no longer sufficient to deliver on-field results.
So where are we now? The club has completely broken down in defensive structure; whilst at the same time is completely unable to transition from defence into attack. The rumour-mill is in full swing; calls coming for coaches to be sacked and players traded; whispers of disunity among the playing group; Nisbitt making unnecessary public statements – needless to say, the papers are doing well at the moment due to the club’s predicament.
And yet the club remains in a top eight position with three matches remaining before finals.
Strange times indeed.
Looking in the wrong places
Energy can neither be created nor destroyed; only converted from one form to another – First Law of Thermodynamics, the Law of Conservation of Energy
Energy. We keep hearing about how the club apparently needs more of it – however it remains questionable whether that will do much to address the tactical problems currently faced by the club.
Let’s face it, allowing an opponent 156 uncontested marks goes beyond whatever level of energy that the team may have – it only happens when your tactical setup is utterly incapable of containing the opposition.
It has little to do with energy when the opposition is able to walk through defensive holes in the middle of the ground, because the zone prioritises marking space over players, to the point where once opposing ball gets to the centre square the defence is opened up so comprehensively that it all but guarantees a shot on goal from directly in front.
The Telstra Tracker figures for the aerobic performance of both teams in the Round 20 match against Collingwood are similar, which dispels the obvious myth that the loss was due to being comprehensively outrun or due to a lack of effort by the players. One team ran effectively, engaging dangerous positions; the other ran wildly to guard redundant space.
Considering the club continues to obsessively select squads that are overly tall, such instruction to run when the team currently features a midfield full of players that clearly remain underdone in their conditioning, combined with less rotational support, is a recipe for a dropoff in midfield output (both offensively and defensively) to occur during matches.
Should it really any surprise then when the club concedes so many easy points late in matches?
As you can see opponents are able to burst out of the blocks against West Coast in 2021 as the system allows them to dominate possession. In response, the Eagles invariably push additional numbers up the ground to fill in holes, chase space and rally briefly; but all the extra effort in chasing shadows wears the team down, leaving the opponent free to re-gain dominance of possession during later stages – this time however, with much lower pressure being applied against them, the opponent is able to convert that dominance into easy goals on the scoreboard.
Only the bottom-placed Kangaroos have conceded more points during last quarters this season than West Coast.
The second-oldest playing list in the competition, with a ruckman that averages less than 70% time on ground, combined with a playing squad that incorporates 6-7 other key talls, in addition to restoration of 20 minute quarters, reduced rotations, shortened preseason and midfielders returning from long-term injuries…
And yet the approach is to somehow out-work the opponent and close out space, primarily through aerobic effort, in order to pin them down and gain territorial superiority.
Running is simply not a strength of this West Coast team, especially so when selection keeps finding places for unnecessary numbers of key-sized players – so expecting it to cover more ground than the opponent as a means of maintaining defensive cohesion is utterly foolish – and unfortunately will more often than not, lead to disappointing outcomes of the type that we been seeing of late.
Having more “energy” won’t make Naitanui into an 85% time on ground ruckman, much like getting Langdon to run 14km+ up the ground chasing grass won’t help the team to win ground balls in attack.
It is one thing to work hard, gut run and show effort – but if that extra effort leads to little in outcome other than early fatigue which allows the opponent to take hold of the game – then it just becomes dumb football.
Undone
However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results — Winston Churchill
Collingwood are a poor team. Even after the Round 20 performance they remain last in the competition for averages in metres gained, inside 50s and clearances; second-last for contested possessions and third-last for points scored.
Yet by half time they were ahead of West Coast 61-11.
The Magpies ended up scoring 14 goals:
All the flaws in the current system were laid bare - the Eagles gave the ball away going forward and then simply could not prevent the Magpies from generating attack out of defence.
- 13 came via ball use through the corridor
- 10 came from West Coast turnovers
- 9 came from chains that began in the defensive half of the ground
Robert Harvey, looking for just his second victory whilst in charge, simply instructed his team to perform the following:
Really simple stuff. But that is all that is necessary to break the Eagles’ defence. There is nothing novel about what Collingwood did; indeed, several teams had already done as such earlier in the season.
- Run the lanes
- Look for the short option
- Generate extra numbers in the corridor
- Move the ball quickly at every opportunity
West Coast still have not adapted to the changes made to the on the mark rule. Defensively, the Eagles still actively allow for the opposition to mark on the defensive side of the corridor – previously the mark would be held up and the subsequent kick would be directed either wide to the wing or long towards the intercept marking prowess waiting in the West Coast backline. This year however, that mark is able to offload to an overlap runner or pivot and spot-up a short target, circumventing the zone in the middle of the ground entirely and providing opportunity for very dangerous entries into attack.
This is clearly evident when one looks at the average metres gained per disposal of opponents:
Opponents create more short disposal possession chains against West Coast than any other team in the competition.
With the offensive capability teams now have at their disposal due to the recent rule changes, the days of being able to zone space through the middle are gone – if an opposing player is there somebody must go to them and mark up.
The dominance of “space” zones that are analogous to those utilised in soccer and hockey and are based more towards containing or directing opposing ball use in a certain way, is over. In their place are basketball-style “track” or hybrid zones, where players will track man-on-man with an opposing counterpart when play is in certain areas of the ground.
The first hurdle the club must overcome on the road to redemption is the abandonment of the zone defence as it currently stands.
The second hurdle relates to the ease in which opponents are able to accumulate possession. West Coast are not just bad – they are in a category all to themselves kind of bad when it comes to opposition dominance of ball.
The club are on average conceding more than 70 additional effective disposals per game in comparison to Geelong – that is the equivalent of providing the opponent with an extra three good players on the ground.
The Round 20 match was the third time in 2021 that the club found itself losing uncontested possessions by more than 100. In more than half of matches this season, the Eagles have lost uncontested possessions by 30 or more.
So, what’s up with that? A club with a (on paper at least) strong midfield contingent that includes arguably the best outside runner of the past decade in Gaff but is being repeatedly obliterated for outside ball by opponents. The answer, once again, lies in tactical absurdity.
As has been described previously on several occasions now, opponents look to nullify the stoppage impact of Naitanui by creating extras through the middle, usually from half forward as the West Coast defence prefers to hold their position rather than track opponents up the ground.
With the advantage of unchecked extras around stoppage, opponents are able to actively block out the primary midfielders of the Eagles, whilst leaving open channels for their team-mates to exploit in the advent of them winning the clearance. The effect can be observed in the contrast for the club between clearances from centre bounces (where opponents cannot create extras due to 6-6-6 positioning) and those from stoppages where those opposing extras are able to be involved:
Only Richmond (who actively remove players from stoppage to setup their turnover-based gameplan) and the bottom-placed Kangaroos have a greater disparity between output at centre bounce and stoppage.
With the team struggling to break even in the middle, the go-to response by the Eagles post-2018 is to cannibalise the forward line and repurpose it as additional cover for the under-pressure defence. The result is West Coast forwards often end up spending significant periods away from where they would usually be expected to operate and forward half pressure unsurprisingly drops off a cliff. A prime example is the current use of Langdon, who has become the latest re-tread version of the redundant aerobic sweeping “Masten” role – occupying so much time in the defensive half of the ground that he is no longer really playing as a forward at all.
Of course, limiting the attack in such a way creates its own set of problems that are arguably far worse than the problem it is setting out to address. It is here that opponents are able to reaffirm their transition game, counterattacking from defence and where the club’s own ball movement from the back half suffers a lonely, withering death.
Rather, one should work to prevent the opposition from creating those midfield extras in the first place.
The third piece that requires correction is offensive ball movement (or the lack thereof).
What is the point of trying to control possession if no ground is being gained? As we as fans are all too aware, much to our frustration, the West Coast will voluntarily lose territory not just once, but multiple times in a match, trying to manufacture a slow switch in play that will never open up the opposing defence and only results in additional pressure being placed upon the Eagles’ defence that was completely unnecessary.
But for what reason is the retreat in the first place? No other club in the entire competition exhibits such risky activity that is so lacking in reward. Perhaps that is because there is a lack of options to kick to as the West Coast forwards are spending so much time up the ground to cover space defensively that they are often unavailable as offensive targets up forward. Thus the current situation is brought about, typified by slow, predictable ball movement that does not pose a threat to the opposing defence, ranking dead last of all teams for generating scores from the defensive half.
Get players ahead of the ball, stretch the opposing defence and provide those defenders with something to be worried about that creates uncertainty in terms of their positioning – that is how you create the opportunity for swift and direct ball movement that can tear a team to pieces.
A familiar solution
We are defined by what we do repeatedly; therefore excellence is a habit, not an act – Aristotle
West Coast has thus far in 2021, performed well below their potential capability. The current position of the club on the ladder however, is reflective of its level of performance this year:
So how can this gap in unfulfilled potential be bridged? And perhaps, just as importantly, how can necessary change be successfully implemented at such short notice, with just three matches remaining before finals?
Recall those three areas that need to be addressed:
- Abandon the current zone defence
- Prevent the opponent from positioning extras through the middle of the ground
- Get more players ahead of the ball
Each of those can be addressed through the implementation of a fairly simple hybrid press.
Sound familiar? It was postulated in the OP of this thread:
Time to expand upon that further and offer a solution to the club’s current woes:
A press anchored at half forward supersedes the redundant zone sitting in the defensive half.
Attack:
A forward line that is mobile, maintains players ahead of ball, stretches the opposing defence and takes away the easy option for opponents to rebound out through the corridor. Despite being a press, only five specialist forward positions are used and just two of those are key-sized – there is no “land of the giants” trash going on here. Similarly, any notion of a “Neo-Masten” aerobic sweeping defensive forward is dead, buried and cremated. This is emphasis on mobility, pressure and creativity – keeping these positions forward of centre at all times and ruthlessly turning opposition turnovers into scoring opportunity.
The full forward remains deep near the goalsquare, granting them plenty of space to lead into and making any opposing defensive sweepers accountable. Specialist small forwards are positioned around CHF for both the immediate ground ball from marking contests and as overlapping secondary disposal options running in towards goal. One of those positions starts as a floater on the attacking side of forward half stoppages before going forward to hit the spillage drop zone of marking contests at pace – in a similar way to how S.Bolton is used at his most damaging at Richmond.
Defence:
A back seven featuring a pair of inverse wingers that operates more as a back five for much of the time. The inverse wings start from defensive positions and run lanes through the corridor, offering additional offensive support to the midfield and greater capability in marking opposing players in the middle of the ground. These are positions that are capable of taking possession, taking the game on and switching lanes quickly through good decisions and disposal. An ideal example of such positions used effectively is Sydney with J.Dawson and J.Lloyd.
Of the three key talls in defence, one is given greater latitude to peel away from their mark and work aggressively as the primary interceptor of incoming disposal from the opposition. Another advantage of having this number of key players down back is that one can be called upon to fulfil secondary ruck duties, leaving the structure of the forward press unaffected.
The emphasis here is to have a defence that is robust against incoming attacks, but also capable of transitioning possession quickly and feeding it through the corridor.
Midfield:
The wings start high and stay high, providing width to what is otherwise a narrow forward line. They track back defensively, but their primary instructions are to provide an outlet ahead of the ball and cut-off any diagonal kick from the opposition defence that is targeting the corridor.
The rest of the midfield group keep narrow in their positioning, ensuring representation of numbers in dangerous areas in the middle of the ground. This is also where the hybrid-nature of this press comes into play – anywhere on the ground within a rectangle bounded by the painted numbers on the 50 metre arcs, opposition players are tightly marked with as little space given as possible (i.e. in the corridor, between the arcs, defence is man-on-man).
When in possession, they look for the lane runners in the middle to get the ball forward rather than bombing it without purpose.
This is a fairly simple plan – I do not see it unreasonable to believe that a squad currently practising a far more complex set of instructions could gain knowledge of its execution pretty quickly.
Put all these pieces together and I have no doubt that you would see a remarkably different looking team in both approach and performance, despite little change in playing personnel.
This season remains incredibly open – all that is necessary is for a team to find a good vein of form at the right time and they can be the last team standing. Nobody gave the Bulldogs a chance in 2016 after losing to 16th placed Fremantle by four goals leading into finals – yet four weeks later they were being crowned premiers.
John Lennon may have said that “All you need is love”, but in football all you need is four good weeks.
With the right setup and outlook, there remains no reason those weeks cannot belong to the West Coast Eagles.
I've never seen so many tables, graphics & categorical breakdowns used just to conclude that all we need to change is for the coach to get angry at the players now & then, but I appreciate your willingness to take on the task and your thoroughness. Excellent analysis.
