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This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of the
RAND Corporation research project Extending Russia: Competing
from Advantageous Ground, sponsored by the Army Quadrennial
Defense Review Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8,
Headquarters, Department of the Army. The purpose of the project
was to examine a range of possible means to extend Russia. By this, we
mean nonviolent measures that could stress Russia’s military or econ-
omy or the regime’s political standing at home and abroad. The steps
we posit would not have either defense or deterrence as their prime
purpose, although they might contribute to both. Rather, these steps
are conceived of as measures that would lead Russia to compete in
domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advan-
tage, causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or
causing the regime to lose domestic and/or international prestige and
influence.
...
Measure 1: Provide Lethal Aid to Ukraine
...
By early 2017, some 60,000 Ukrainian
soldiers were facing off against some 40,000 Russian-backed separatist
forces—including an estimated 5,000 Russian soldiers—in a conflict
that has so far cost some 10,000 people their lives.
...
In December 2017, the United States
approved the sale of “defensive” lethal weapons to Ukraine, although it
did not specify what weapons fell into the category.
The United States could also become more vocal in its support for
NATO membership for Ukraine. Some U.S. policymakers—including
Republican Senator and 2016 presidential candidate Marco Rubio—
backed this approach in the past and Ukrainian President Porosh-
enko recently promised to hold a referendum on the issue in the near
future. While NATO’s requirement for unanimity makes it unlikely
that Ukraine could gain membership in the foreseeable future, Washing-
ton’s pushing this possibility could boost Ukrainian resolve while lead-
ing Russia to redouble its efforts to forestall such a development.
Benefits
Expanding U.S. assistance to Ukraine, including lethal military
assistance, would likely increase the costs to Russia, in both blood
and treasure, of holding the Donbass region. More Russian aid to the
separatists and an additional Russian troop presence would likely be
required, leading to larger expenditures, equipment losses, and Rus-
sian casualties. The latter could become quite controversial at home,
as it did when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.
Two other somewhat more speculative benefits might flow from
such an expanded U.S. commitment. Countries elsewhere that look to
the United States for their security might be heartened. Some of those
states might find new reasons to avoid developing their own nuclear
weapons.
...
Risks
An increase in U.S. security assistance to Ukraine would likely lead
to a commensurate increase in both Russian aid to the separatists
and Russian military forces in Ukraine, thus sustaining the con-
flict at a somewhat higher level of intensity. 20 Lieutenant General
Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe,
argued against giving Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine for pre-
cisely this reason.
Alternatively, Russia might counter-escalate, committing more
troops and pushing them deeper into Ukraine. Russia might even pre-
empt U.S. action, escalating before any additional U.S. aid arrives. Such
escalation might extend Russia; Eastern Ukraine is already a drain.
Taking more of Ukraine might only increase the burden, albeit at the
expense of the Ukrainian people. However, such a move might also
come at a significant cost to Ukraine and to U.S. prestige and credibil-
ity. This could produce disproportionately large Ukrainian casualties,
territorial losses, and refugee flows. It might even lead Ukraine into a
disadvantageous peace.
Russian Propaganda.
RAND Corporation research project Extending Russia: Competing
from Advantageous Ground, sponsored by the Army Quadrennial
Defense Review Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8,
Headquarters, Department of the Army. The purpose of the project
was to examine a range of possible means to extend Russia. By this, we
mean nonviolent measures that could stress Russia’s military or econ-
omy or the regime’s political standing at home and abroad. The steps
we posit would not have either defense or deterrence as their prime
purpose, although they might contribute to both. Rather, these steps
are conceived of as measures that would lead Russia to compete in
domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advan-
tage, causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or
causing the regime to lose domestic and/or international prestige and
influence.
...
Measure 1: Provide Lethal Aid to Ukraine
...
By early 2017, some 60,000 Ukrainian
soldiers were facing off against some 40,000 Russian-backed separatist
forces—including an estimated 5,000 Russian soldiers—in a conflict
that has so far cost some 10,000 people their lives.
...
In December 2017, the United States
approved the sale of “defensive” lethal weapons to Ukraine, although it
did not specify what weapons fell into the category.
The United States could also become more vocal in its support for
NATO membership for Ukraine. Some U.S. policymakers—including
Republican Senator and 2016 presidential candidate Marco Rubio—
backed this approach in the past and Ukrainian President Porosh-
enko recently promised to hold a referendum on the issue in the near
future. While NATO’s requirement for unanimity makes it unlikely
that Ukraine could gain membership in the foreseeable future, Washing-
ton’s pushing this possibility could boost Ukrainian resolve while lead-
ing Russia to redouble its efforts to forestall such a development.
Benefits
Expanding U.S. assistance to Ukraine, including lethal military
assistance, would likely increase the costs to Russia, in both blood
and treasure, of holding the Donbass region. More Russian aid to the
separatists and an additional Russian troop presence would likely be
required, leading to larger expenditures, equipment losses, and Rus-
sian casualties. The latter could become quite controversial at home,
as it did when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.
Two other somewhat more speculative benefits might flow from
such an expanded U.S. commitment. Countries elsewhere that look to
the United States for their security might be heartened. Some of those
states might find new reasons to avoid developing their own nuclear
weapons.
...
Risks
An increase in U.S. security assistance to Ukraine would likely lead
to a commensurate increase in both Russian aid to the separatists
and Russian military forces in Ukraine, thus sustaining the con-
flict at a somewhat higher level of intensity. 20 Lieutenant General
Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe,
argued against giving Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine for pre-
cisely this reason.
Alternatively, Russia might counter-escalate, committing more
troops and pushing them deeper into Ukraine. Russia might even pre-
empt U.S. action, escalating before any additional U.S. aid arrives. Such
escalation might extend Russia; Eastern Ukraine is already a drain.
Taking more of Ukraine might only increase the burden, albeit at the
expense of the Ukrainian people. However, such a move might also
come at a significant cost to Ukraine and to U.S. prestige and credibil-
ity. This could produce disproportionately large Ukrainian casualties,
territorial losses, and refugee flows. It might even lead Ukraine into a
disadvantageous peace.
Russian Propaganda.
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